What Do We Experience When Listening to a Familiar Language? by Anna Drożdżowicz
365
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XX, No. 60, 2020
What Do We Experience When 
Listening to a Familiar Language?
ANNA DROŻDŻOWICZ*
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
What do we systematically experience when hearing an utterance in a 
familiar language? A popular and intuitive answer has it that we experi-
ence understanding an utterance or what the speaker said or communi-
cated by uttering a sentence. Understanding a meaning conveyed by the 
speaker is an important element of linguistic communication that might 
be experienced in such cases. However, in this paper I argue that two oth-
er elements that typically accompany the production of spoken linguistic 
utterances should be carefully considered when we address the question 
of what is systematically experienced when we listen to utterances in a 
familiar language. First, when we listen to a familiar language we reg-
ister various prosodic phenomena that speakers routinely produce. Sec-
ond, we typically register stable vocal characteristics of speakers, such 
as pitch, tempo or accent, that are often systematically related to various 
properties of the speaker. Thus, the answer to the question of what we 
typically experience when listening to a familiar language is likely to be 
a complex one. Dedicated attention is needed to understand the nature 
and scope of phenomenology that pertains to linguistic communication. 
This paper lays some groundwork for that project.
Keywords: Linguistic understanding, experiences, prosody, lin-
guistic communication.
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1. Introduction
You are at the seaside leisurely fl icking through a magazine. A friend 
calls out your name and asks if you would like to take another swim. 
There is energy and enthusiasm in her voice, and you have a strong 
impression that she is inviting you because she wants to take a swim 
as well. Your answer will probably be a quick cheerful ‘yes’.
What do we experience when listening to a familiar language? For 
example, what do we experience when we hear a friend enthusiastical-
ly inviting us to take a swim? There is a liberal strategy for answering 
that question. After all, there are so many things one might experience 
when listening to an utterance produced in a familiar language. An 
endless variety of impressions may arise when we hear others speak-
ing and communicate with them. Upon hearing your friend’s invitation 
to take a swim, you might have a vivid memory of last year’s summer 
holidays. An invitation might remind you of a scene from your favou-
rite movie. You might feel relaxed and safe. You might feel threatened, 
as in the case when, unbeknownst to your friend, you nearly drowned 
during your last swim. You might have an unpleasant impression that 
your friend is nudging you to embrace a certain kind of healthy life-
style, or you might have an impression that you and your friend have 
the same needs.
This would then be the answer provided by those who adopt the 
liberal strategy: virtually anything might be experienced when listen-
ing to a familiar language. However, the liberal strategy strikes me 
as an evasive one. Such varied experiences and impressions as those 
described above can, and perhaps often do arise when we listen to oth-
ers speaking in a familiar language, but they need not. Moreover, when 
they do arise, they often do so with no specifi c regularity or order. A 
more fruitful way of addressing the question of what we experience 
when listening to a familiar language is to focus on elements that 
might be systematically experienced. When I ask what we experience 
when listening to a familiar language in this paper, I am asking about, 
and will consider, only those elements that typically and systematically 
arise in linguistic communication and could thus typically be part of 
our overall conscious experience. 
How can we decide whether something is a candidate for being ex-
perienced systematically? The elements that I will consider in this pa-
per are those that: (a) result from forms of expression and information 
transfer that are available to typically developed speakers, and (b) that 
typically developed hearers register and experience thanks to specifi c 
psychological and linguistic mechanisms employed in voice perception 
and spoken linguistic communication. Systematicity, as understood 
here, will not imply that such elements would need to be present in 
our experience on each and every occasion. For example, if a speaker 
does not convey or reveal some information when producing a linguistic 
utterance, a hearer will not register that information. Thus, I will not 
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go so far as to argue that the elements discussed in this paper would 
be necessary and suffi cient for the case described. Linguistic communi-
cation and its phenomenology are complex phenomena and providing 
such conditions would be an overly ambitious task, at least in one go. 
Still, many real-life phenomena occur suffi ciently frequently in normal 
conditions to warrant philosophical attention, even though exceptions 
may arise.
So what do we systematically experience in typical cases of hearing 
an utterance in a familiar language? One strategy would be to provide 
a quick and intuitive answer: we experience understanding an utter-
ance or what the speaker said or communicated by uttering a sentence. 
When my friend asks me whether I would like to take a swim, I have 
an experience of her asking whether I would like to take a swim, or, in 
other words, I have an experience of understanding that she asked me 
whether I would like to take another swim and in that way invited me 
to do so.1 This intuitive answer seems both quick and simple. In recent 
literature on the epistemology of linguistic understanding, experiences 
of what was said with an utterance, experiences of meanings commu-
nicated with utterances or experiences of understanding, depending on 
one’s preferred terminology, have been a subject of intense debate. As 
we shall see (section 2) neither explaining the nature of such states nor 
explaining their epistemic roles is an easy task. This might be one rea-
son why most discussions that might provide insights into the question 
of what we experience when listening to a familiar language have so far 
focused on experiences of meanings communicated with an utterance 
(or of linguistic understanding).
This focus may suggest, that the question about the phenomenology 
of linguistic communication boils down to whatever we can systemati-
cally say about the phenomenology of meanings or the phenomenology 
of understanding. In this paper, I will argue that this is not the case. 
The intuitive strategy described above would be too restrictive to pro-
vide a satisfying answer to the question of what we systematically ex-
perience when listening to linguistic utterances in a familiar language. 
Understanding or grasping a meaning conveyed by the speaker might 
of course be an important element of what we experience there and 
then. But in the course of this paper I will provide evidence that apart 
from this, two other elements that typically accompany the production 
of spoken linguistic utterances should be considered as candidates for 
what is systematically experienced when we listen to linguistic utter-
ances in a familiar language.
First, I will argue that when we listen to a familiar language we 
also typically register a variety of prosodic phenomena that speakers 
routinely produce, in both controlled and spontaneous manner (Whar-
1 In this and other cases, both the content of what was said with an utterance 
and its force, in this case an invitation, are commonly taken to be experienced (e.g. 
Fricker 2003).
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ton 2009). Prosodic phenomena take many forms and often make im-
portant contributions to linguistic communication, affecting the every-
day interactions involved. As such, they should be considered when 
addressing the question of what is systematically experienced by hear-
ers. A friendly and enthusiastic invitation to take a swim sounds differ-
ent from an indifferent one, or from one that merely attempts to sound 
friendly and enthusiastic.
Second, I will argue that, when we listen to linguistic utterances in 
a familiar language, we typically also register stable vocal characteris-
tics of speakers, such as pitch and tempo, which are determined by the 
physiology of the speaker’s vocal apparatus and the circumstances of 
vocal production, as well as vocal characteristics that result from socio-
linguistic environment, such as accent. Importantly, such stable vocal 
characteristics are often systematically related to various properties 
of the speaker, such as sex, age, ethnicity (Belin et al. 2004, Baumann 
and Belin 2010; Owren et al. 2007; Mulac and Giles 1996; Rakić 2019). 
Thus, hearing a linguistic utterance in a particular voice will normally 
reveal a lot of important information about the speaker that the speak-
er does not intend to communicate.2
The evidence presented in this paper will show that the answer to 
the question of what we typically experience when listening to a fa-
miliar language is likely to be a complex one. The phenomenology of 
linguistic communication is probably richer than many mainstream 
philosophical debates on linguistic understanding would suggest. Care-
ful investigation of whether and to what extent the three elements pre-
sented in the paper could enter heares’ consciousness and what sig-
nalling functions they have is needed. This kind of investigation will 
require a detailed analysis of both philosophical and empirical argu-
ments and goes beyond the scope of this paper. The goal of this paper 
is to lay some groundwork for the project of addressing the question of 
what we systematically experience when listening to a familiar lan-
guage by pointing to new areas of research. For readers who are not 
immediately excited and curious about the question discussed in this 
paper, I would like to offer a brief explanation of why I think it is both 
interesting and important, thus making the task worthwhile.
First, it is interesting and important to describe and understand 
what we could systematically experience when listening to a familiar 
language. While a lot of philosophical attention has been paid to de-
scribing and explaining the nature of visual experiences and (some-
what less) to the nature of auditory experience of environmental 
sounds, apart from debates on experiences of understanding, there 
has been relatively less interest in the philosophical investigation of 
auditory experiences of listening to a familiar language (for rare ex-
2 In this paper I focus entirely on spoken language and its phenomenology. 
Parallels and differences in the typical phenomenology of reading require separate 
discussion.
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ceptions see: Smith 2009, Di Bona 2017, Drożdżowicz 2020). And yet 
such experiences are without a doubt part and parcel of our auditory 
environment, given that linguistic communication is a pervasive form 
of sharing information among humans. Second, systematic impressions 
of speakers can and often do play a role in linguistic communication by 
steering, affecting and sometimes biasing social interactions that rely 
on it. In the example above, specifi c properties of your friend’s voice, 
e.g. those relating to the length of her vocal tract, determine how she 
sounds, namely as a middle-aged woman. Those properties allow you 
to recognize the voice that utters the invitation as the one belonging 
to your friend. In order to understand how we interact linguistically, 
dedicated attention is needed to provide an inclusive picture of what is 
experienced in linguistic communication.
The paper is structured into three main sections, each presenting 
one of the three elements that are typically registered when listening 
to an utterance in a familiar language. In section 2 I present recent de-
bates concerning experiences of understanding what was said or com-
municated with an utterance. I summarize the main results concerning 
this topic and focus on pointing out questions for future research. I will 
briefl y sketch my own view on the matter but will not defend it in de-
tail here. In section 3 I present evidence which supports the claim that 
when we listen to a familiar language we commonly register a whole 
variety of prosodic phenomena and argue that they are another can-
didate to consider for what we could systematically experience in lin-
guistic communication. Section 4 presents evidence for the claim that 
we also systematically register stable vocal characteristics of a speaker 
that reveal important information about them. Impressions based on 
such characteristics are yet another candidate for what we could sys-
tematically experience. I conclude in section 5.
2. Experiencing linguistic understanding
Setting aside cases of unsuccessful communication, when you hear an 
utterance in a familiar language, you typically come to understand 
what the speaker communicated with that utterance on a particular oc-
casion. Many have argued that in such cases competent language users 
experience states of understanding linguistic utterances (Hunter 1998; 
Fricker 2003; Reiland 2015; Nes 2016; Brogaard 2018). Simple though 
it is, this observation has been a starting point for intense debates 
about the nature and epistemic roles of the experience in question. 
Such experiences are commonly illustrated using so-called contrast 
cases. Imagine again hearing your friend utter the invitation “Would 
you like to take another swim?”. Imagine now that everything is the 
same, except that your friend is speaking in a language totally unfa-
miliar to you, and says the same thing, i.e. invites you to take another 
swim. What will strike you is that the experience you have when listen-
ing to the second utterance in a language you do not know differs dra-
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matically from the experience of a language you understand and speak 
fl uently.3 This observation is typically taken to be important prima fa-
cie (although not the only) evidence for the claim that experiences of 
linguistic understanding exist.4
Here is how such experiences are often portrayed in the current 
debate. It is generally agreed that when a hearer has an experience 
of understanding an utterance, she grasps at least one proposition, 
which would roughly correspond to the asserted meaning of that ut-
terance. Most participants in this debate seem also to agree that typi-
cally such experiences would involve or somehow indicate grasping 
the enriched, saturated meaning of an utterance and not the minimal 
meaning (Fricker 2003; Nes 2016; Brogaard 2018; Gasparri and Murez 
2019). For example, when you have an experience of understanding 
your friend uttering “Would you like to take another swim?”, as in the 
above situation, you grasp, among other things, that: “you”, in this con-
text, refers to yourself, not to anyone else who might be at the beach, 
that the invitation, in this context, is to take a swim now or in the near 
future and not at just any point in the future, etc. Apart from rare oc-
casions, hearers do not grasp minimal meanings with unassigned ref-
erents and unresolved ambiguities (Smith 2010).
When characterizing experiences of understanding linguistic utter-
ances, it is usual to list their involuntary nature, automaticity, and 
prima facie compelling character. Normally we have little or no control 
over whether upon listening to an utterance in a familiar language we 
experience understanding it or not (Fodor 1983: 52). Such experiences 
are usually taken to arise spontaneously and automatically as soon 
as an utterance is heard. According to many, their immediate pres-
ence serves as prima facie compelling evidence for beliefs about what a 
speaker intended to communicate with an utterance (e.g. Fricker 2003; 
Brogaard 2018). Those features have been argued by some to support 
the idea that experiences of meanings or of linguistic understand-
ing are interestingly similar to paradigmatic perceptual experiences 
(Hunter 1998; Bayne 2009; Siegel 2006; Brogaard 2018), but the exact 
nature of this similarity has been a subject of considerable debate.
At least three sets of questions have animated recent debates about 
experiences of linguistic understanding. These concern: (1) their na-
ture, (2) their epistemic roles, and (3) the methods used to investigate 
them. Starting with (1), according to what has been described as the 
semantic perceptual view, properties like having meaning x can be 
represented in the hearer’s perceptual experience (Siegel 2011; Bayne 
3 Moreover, typically utterances in unfamiliar languages are not perceived as 
strings of words, given that hearers are not sensitive to phonemes of a particular 
language (O’Callaghan 2011).
4 This is a minimal commitment that many in this debate accept. Other evidence 
comes from the phenomenological shift that occurs when listening to sinewave 
speech (Remez et al., 1981). For a detailed discussion of this case and evidence it 
provides, see O’Callaghan (2011; 2015).
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2009; Brogaard 2018, 2019). On that approach, the nature of experi-
ences of utterance understanding is perceptual (or of perceptual seem-
ings, Brogaard 2018). The experience we have when listening to a fa-
miliar language is an experience of hearing meanings. Arguably, the 
properties that are perceived in this case are many: Tim Bayne (2009) 
observes that we perceive “both (low-level) changes in phonological 
structure and (high-level) semantic properties”.5 In order to have an 
experience of understanding an utterance in a familiar language, a 
hearer has to perceive the phonetic and phonological properties of an 
utterance (O’Callaghan 2015). But it is a contentious matter whether in 
such cases meaning properties are also perceived, and in recent years 
the semantic perceptual view has been the subject of some criticism.
According to Casey O’Callaghan (2011), the contrast cases that are 
often presented in favour of the semantic perceptual view are best ex-
plained in terms of differences in experiencing low-level phonological 
properties of linguistic utterances and thus do not support claims about 
semantic perception. The view has also been criticized on epistemologi-
cal grounds. Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2019) has recently argued that 
the claim that experiences of hearing meaning provide immediate jus-
tifi cation for hearers’ beliefs about what a speaker communicated with 
an utterance (e.g. Brogaard 2018) is unfounded. Another contentious 
issue has been whether the semantic perceptual view is psychologically 
realistic and could be made compatible with our best knowledge about 
the psychology of linguistic comprehension (Drożdżowicz 2019), as 
well as whether it can accommodate the systematic role of context and 
background knowledge in linguistic communication (Brogaard 2018, 
2019; cf Gasparri and Murez 2019). A related contender in this debate, 
the view that experiences of linguistic understanding are instances of 
cognitive phenomenology characteristic of cognitive states (Strawson 
2010; Siewert 1998; Dodd 2014), has also been subject to criticisms on 
parallel grounds (Prinz 2011; see also Montague 2017).6
A quite different approach to the nature of such experiences main-
tains that meanings (or thoughts) are not the salient contents of such 
experiences, but rather that what hearers experience is fl uency of un-
derstanding. On my own view (Drożdżowicz forthcoming), experiences 
of understanding are epistemic feelings of linguistic fl uency that result 
from evaluative monitoring processes.7 There is extensive evidence that 
such processes are typically involved in utterance comprehension (No-
zarri and Novick 2017; Pickering and Garrod 2013). The perceptual ap-
pearance of understanding experiences is, on this view, explained as re-
sulting from the deployment of early-stage auditory processes of speech 
perception. Thus, on my proposal, experiences of linguistic understand-
5 There might also be other properties (morphological, syntactic) to consider.
6 This passage draws on section 2 from Drożdżowicz 2019.
7 For the purpose of this paper I briefl y mention my view as one of the contenders 
in this debate. I defend it in detail in another paper (Drożdżowicz forthcoming).
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ing are fi rst and foremost metacognitive feelings that reveal the degree 
of the success in comprehending an utterance. For example, when you 
hear a friend inviting you to take another swim, you might have an 
experience of understanding that amounts to a quick immediate sig-
nal indicating that you have successfully comprehended your friend’s 
invitation and can immediately proceed to produce an answer, act on 
that invitation, etc. For these purposes, you do not have to represent or 
reconstruct the communicated meaning of her utterance as part of your 
conscious experience, but simply take for granted the feeling that you 
got the message of her utterance right, and act on it.8 Although the out-
comes of the ongoing debate on the nature of experiences of understand-
ing still remain to be seen, the most discussed semantic perceptual view 
is currently under a lot of pressure. This opens up space for new con-
tenders and calls for further investigation of question (1).
Questions concerning the epistemic roles of experiences of under-
standing (2), or of meanings conveyed with linguistic utterances, are 
of immediate interest to epistemologists working on linguistic com-
munication and testimony. In recent debates on the epistemology of 
language understanding, it has been argued that such experiences: (a) 
justify beliefs about what a speaker communicated or said with an ut-
terance (Hunter 1998; Brogaard 2018: 2969); (b) provide justifi cation 
that is necessary for acquiring knowledge about what a speaker said 
(Fricker 2003: 345)9; (c) amount to what states of language understand-
ing are (Pettit 2002: 544); and perhaps (d) trigger the “content enter-
taining” states of understanding (Longworth 2018: 825).10
Let us look at some evidence presented in favour of the claim that 
experiences of linguistic understanding provide important, justifi cation 
for beliefs (Brogaard 2018) and/or knowledge about what the speaker 
conveyed with an utterance (Fricker 2003). Assuming that we are in a 
typical communicative context, i.e. one where both speaker and hearer 
are using the same language in a cooperative way (Fricker 2003: 332), 
what could be the epistemic contribution of an experience of under-
standing an utterance produced by the speaker? In our toy example, 
your friend asks you: “Would you like to take another swim?”. Accord-
8 This is compatible with the fact that in other, albeit less prevalent, cases of 
obstructed communication you might need to refl ectively reconstruct the meaning 
you have grasped.
9 Fricker (2003) uses the notion of what is said when describing such knowledge 
and beliefs, but her clarifi cation of experiences of understanding (and corresponding 
beliefs) suggests that their contents concern not just what is strictly speaking said 
with an utterance, but what a speaker intended to communicate with an utterance 
on a particular occasion, leaving it open whether all pragmatic meanings (e.g. 
implicatures, metaphors) can be experienced in a similar manner. A similar notion 
is used in Brogaard (2018).
10 Guy Longworth’s notion of ‘perceptual encounter with an utterance’ seems 
parallel to the notion of experience of understanding. On the other hand, his content-
entertaining states seem to involve both perceptual and belief-like elements, so they 
might perhaps be closer to the experiences discussed here.
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ing to Fricker (2003) and Brogaard (2018), in this case your experience 
of understanding what she communicated with that utterance provides 
an immediate prima facie justifi cation for your belief about what she 
said,11 i.e. that she has invited you to take another swim. However, 
having a relevant experience of understanding would rarely suffi ce for 
your belief to be justifi ed or to afford knowledge. On their view, you 
would also need to have secured a kind of warrant that is captured in 
broadly externalist or reliabilist terms. For example, one could main-
tain that for such a belief to be justifi ed, a hearer must exercise reliably 
functioning linguistic capacities. Lucky beliefs, based on matching ex-
periences of understanding produced by the unreliable workings of the 
language system, typically would not count as justifi ed. 
How then should we understand the strength of the claim that 
experiences of understanding are normally required for justifi ed be-
liefs (and/or knowledge) about what a speaker said? Fricker’s case of 
Ida (2003), initially presented as an argument against the reliabilist 
conception of language understanding (e.g. Schiffer 1987), is often dis-
cussed in this context:
IDA: Ida has an internal, module-like device implemented in her brain that 
provides her with correct beliefs about the meanings of utterances in Rus-
sian: “When Ida hears a sentence in Russian, it sounds like meaningless 
noise to her. Yet after hearing it, she fi nds herself with a strong inclina-
tion to believe that a certain speech act has been effected by that – to her 
– meaningless burst of noise. Ida instantiates the correct ‘template’. Her 
beliefs about what is said in Russian utterances are due to a language pro-
cessing, belief-generating module in her, and are reliably true.” (Fricker 
2003: 337)
According to Fricker, without experiences of understanding Russian 
utterances, Ida cannot know what Russian speakers say. The example 
is used by Fricker to support her claim that “the phenomenology of 
understanding is essential to how knowledge of what is said is gained, 
in normal language use” (345). Although Ida satisfi es the reliabilist 
conception of understanding, she does not have any reasons available 
to her to support her beliefs about what utterances in Russian mean. 
Fricker argues that, intuitively, Ida does not know what utterances in 
Russian mean. On the contrary, utterances in Russian sound meaning-
less to her. Ida’s case is different from the case of normal language un-
derstanding because her way of gaining reliable beliefs about meaning 
is “phenomenally lacking”.12
I would like to suggest that the epistemic benefi t that typical lan-
guage users seem to have over Ida in this case could perhaps be cap-
11 In these discussions a distinction between beliefs about what a speaker said 
with an utterance and beliefs in the content of their utterance is typically assumed.
12 As presented in this scenario, Ida is of course very different from typical 
language users who have a normally developed language system. The dialectic role 
of this example is therefore constrained by the stipulations about how Ida’s module 
works.
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tured by the notion of doxastic justifi cation. A belief is doxastically jus-
tifi ed to the extent that it is epistemically supported by the reasons on 
which the agent bases it (Dormandy 2018: 77). Although Ida’s beliefs 
about what Russian speakers say are reliably causally sustained by the 
workings of her internal module, by their very defi nition, the workings 
of her module do not fulfi l the condition for doxastic justifi cation, i.e. 
they cannot be treated as a reason for her beliefs. But an observation-
based meta-belief that she is reliably forming such beliefs due to the 
inner workings of her module could provide such a reason. One could 
argue that this would be an improvement on Ida’s current epistemic 
situation. From a believer’s perspective, obtaining any good reason can 
increase the durability and confi dence of an agent’s belief (Dormandy 
2018). Cases like IDA should not lead us to conclude that experiences of 
understanding are strictly speaking necessary for justifi ed belief and/
or knowledge about what a speaker conveyed with an utterance. After 
all, there may be other possibly valuable ways of forming such beliefs. 
Consider the following hypothetical case:
ADA: Ada has just met a Portuguese friend. She does not speak Por-
tuguese. However, there is a language pill she could take that would 
make her acquire reliable true beliefs about the meanings of utterances 
in Portuguese. Ada would be instantiating a correct template from ut-
terances in Portuguese to beliefs about what these utterances mean. 
There is only one potential downside - the pill does not induce the ap-
propriate, typical phenomenology of understanding Portuguese utter-
ances that most speakers of Portuguese typically enjoy. Should Ada 
take the pill?13
Intuitively, Ada would be better off if she took the pill, for she could 
then come to correctly and reliably believe what her Portuguese friend 
is saying. Even without the typical corresponding phenomenology of 
understanding, Ada would have more understanding of Portuguese 
than before taking the pill. Ada’s beliefs about what Portuguese speak-
ers say could be epistemically supported by her meta-belief that the pill 
allows her to reliably form such beliefs. Notwithstanding the intuitive 
verdict that Ada should take the pill, her epistemic situation would 
still be quite different from that of typical Portuguese speakers. There 
seem to be some epistemic benefi ts which would not be available to her, 
namely, an experience of understanding that could also doxastically 
support a corresponding belief.
Arguably, a somewhat different story about the epistemic role of 
experiences of understanding would accompany the view that they 
are epistemic feelings of linguistic fl uency (Drożdżowicz forthcoming), 
since on that view such experiences do not present meanings as their 
contents but merely signal the fl uency of their comprehension. Many 
epistemic feelings can be useful for deliberate metacognitive purposes, 
such as guiding a subject’s attention or motivating one to reconsider 
13 I thank Sandy Goldberg for suggesting this example.
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one’s epistemic standing (Dokic 2012; Koriat 2007). Epistemic feelings 
of linguistic fl uency could also fulfi l some such roles. In a typical case, a 
feeling of fl uency could signal that the hearer can proceed to utilize in-
formation about an utterance in communication, belief formation, and 
action. On the other hand, an epistemic feeling indicating a lower level 
of fl uency may signal a need to allocate more resources, repair, etc. 
Epistemic feelings of linguistic fl uency could guide our cognitive func-
tioning in several important ways and in this way fulfi l some epistemic 
roles.14 Unsurprisingly, at least some answers to questions about the 
epistemic roles of such states (2) seem to depend on our views of their 
nature (1).
The fi nal set of questions (3), concerns methodological issues about 
how the nature of experiences of understanding should be investi-
gated. Which considerations should bear on the above questions and 
shape our views? Some people investigate the phenomenology of such 
experiences and build arguments based on contrast cases (e.g. Siegel 
2010; Dodd 2014); others emphasize their epistemic roles in acquiring 
information and social interactions (e.g. Brogaard 2018; Balcerak Jack-
son 2019); still others advocate drawing on empirical evidence from 
psychological research on speech and utterance comprehension (e.g. 
O’Callaghan 2011; Gasparri and Murez 2020). Another complexity con-
cerns whether and to what extent the philosophers' notion of conscious 
experience, as used in the debates on linguistic understanding, can be 
made compatible with currently available research on consciousness 
in psychology and neuroscience and, indeed, whether we currently 
have robust empirical evidence that could be informative for some of 
these issues. The intuitive answer to the question of what we experi-
ence when listening to a familiar language is only apparently a simple 
one, as the complex landscape of questions and views charted in this 
section illustrates. Issues concerning the phenomenology of linguistic 
understanding require more attention, given our common reliance on 
information acquired through linguistic communication (e.g. Goldberg 
2018). But, as I will show in the next two sections, they do not exhaust 
what we should consider when we investigate the question of what we 
systematically experience when listening to a familiar language.
3. Registering vocal prosody
In many typical cases of linguistic communication, speakers produce 
linguistic utterances in a broader behavioural context. Spoken lan-
guage is accompanied by a wide variety of non-verbal phenomena 
including vocal, facial, and bodily gestures (Wharton 2009). Usually, 
such gestures indicate the speaker’s internal mental state—i.e., they 
convey information about their emotions, feelings, and attitudes to-
ward the meanings expressed. Although we are often aware of using 
14 This passage draws on material from (Drożdżowicz forthcoming).
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such gestures while speaking, and sometimes may even intentionally 
exploit them to achieve certain effects in our audience, in many cases, 
such gestures are produced spontaneously and beyond our conscious 
control. Non-linguistic gestures of various kinds can infl uence linguis-
tic communication and may impact our understanding of utterances 
(Wharton 2009).
Linguistic communication is multimodal: it commonly exploits not 
only words, but also non-verbal vocal cues, as well as a whole variety 
of visual cues from the speaker’s facial expression and bodily gestures. 
Bearing in mind that vocal and visual cues often interact, a phenom-
enon that recently has been a subject of intense study (e.g. Zhang et al. 
2018; Frohlich et al. 2019), I will focus here on prosody—i.e., vocal ele-
ments of speech that are not individual phonetic segments (vowels and 
consonants) but properties of syllables and larger units of speech that 
commonly accompany the production of linguistic utterances (Speer 
and Blodgett 2006). This abstraction from visual input to linguistic 
communication is both necessary and warranted. The question to be 
investigated is what we systematically experience when listening to a 
familiar language. In addressing this, my focus will therefore be pri-
marily on the auditory modality. In this section, I will provide evidence 
in support of the claim that prosodic phenomena are an important ele-
ment that we routinely register when listening to a familiar language. 
Because of that they constitute a plausible candidate to consider for 
what can be systematically experienced in linguistic communication. 
Prosody can be and often is recognized without any visual input thanks 
to a specifi c psychological system that has been studied separately in 
experimental psychology of language. To illustrate, when your friend 
enthusiastically invites you to take another swim, in order to hear en-
thusiasm in her voice, you do not need to lift your sunhat to see her face 
or other bodily gestures. Whether she is smiling and vigorously imitat-
ing a crawl stroke, her enthusiasm, when expressed in the vocal proso-
dy that accompanies her utterance, can be independently recognized.15
Prosody is an umbrella term encompassing a variety of vocal phe-
nomena occurring in speech production. Specifi cally, it covers supra-
segmental phonetic phenomena, i.e., properties that belong to larger 
units than phonemes, including syllables, phones, words, various in-
tonation phrases and utterances (Speer and Blodgett 2006). There is 
general agreement that prosodic contributions to linguistic communi-
cation range from the intentionally produced, properly linguistic, and 
often language-specifi c ones (e.g., lexical tone, stress or pitch accent) 
to spontaneous, involuntary, or ‘natural’ ones (e.g. an angry, agitated 
or enthusiastic tone of voice) (Gussenhoven 2002; Pell 2002; Wharton 
15 The facial and bodily gestures, when perceived, may of course reinforce or 
modify your experience. An invitation produced in an angry tone of voice, but with 
a smile on the face would have a different effect than the one produced in a happy 
tone of voice and with a smile. Due to limited space, I leave discussion of such cases 
for another occasion.
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2009: 139).16 It is also commonly accepted that many contributions that 
prosodic gestures make to linguistic communication are context-depen-
dent (Hirschberg 2002). Context may determine the degree of their con-
tribution (hearing enthusiasm in your friend’s voice may for example 
depend on your expectations about how much in general she likes to 
swim). It may also entirely determine the nature of a specifi c contribu-
tion (hearing enthusiasm in your friend’s voice may strike you as fake 
and incongruent with the invitation, given that on such occasions she 
almost always speaks in a fairly neutral, fl at tone of voice). Because of 
that, the prospects for a simple mapping from many prosodic phenom-
ena to their communicative contributions are generally agreed to be 
dim (Hirschberg 2002, see also Wharton 2009: ch. 6).
The category of intentionally produced properly linguistic prosodic 
gestures is wide and includes, among other things, phenomena such 
as: contour variation, variation in location and type of pitch accents 
(e.g. nuclear stress on a single word), accent on discourse markers (e.g. 
but, although), accent on new information as opposed to what is given, 
accent on focus-sensitive operators (e.g. only, some, must), phrasing 
variation to chunk information in an utterance, variation in timing and 
pitch range to mark speaker involvement, fi nal lowering (see Hirsch-
berg 2002). The spontaneous, ‘natural’ prosodic contributions overlap 
to a large degree with what has been investigated under the label of 
emotional prosody.
‘Emotional prosody’ is a term used to describe phenomena in which 
speakers communicate emotions, either unintentionally or intention-
ally, by modifying acoustic attributes of their voice, and how these vo-
cal cues are perceived and recognized by listeners (Pell and Kotz 2011). 
It has been argued that the neurocognitive system responsible for the 
processing of emotional prosody in hearers is distinct from the system 
responsible for the processing of speech sounds (Pell 2006), as well as 
from systems responsible for the processing of socially-relevant infor-
mation recovered from the voice, such as age or gender (Belin et al. 
2004; Spreckelmeyer et al. 2009). Some evidence suggests that vocal 
expressions of emotions are perceived categorically (e.g. Laukka 2005), 
thereby corresponding to a set of basic human emotions that also have 
discrete forms of expression in the face (Ekman 1994, but see Barett 
2017; Celeghin et al. 2017). Furthermore, vocal expressions of anger, 
disgust, fear, sadness, and happiness/joy can be accurately recognized 
when listening to a foreign language (e.g. Pell et al. 2009; Sherer et al. 
2001). This suggests that at least these emotions have discrete acous-
tic-perceptual properties in the voice which manifest in similar ways 
across languages. According to empirical studies, vocally expressed 
emotions in speech are registered implicitly and automatically based 
on specifi c vocal cues (Kotz and Paulmann 2007). Studies also suggest 
16 Several distinct and possibly overlapping distinctions are grouped here 
following recent discussions on the topic.
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that there are important differences in the underlying time course for 
typical recognition of basic emotions from vocal expressions. Anger, 
sadness, fear, and neutral expressions are recognized more accurately 
shortly after hearing vocal cues than happiness and disgust. However, 
as speech unfolds with time, recognition of happiness improves signifi -
cantly towards the end of the utterance, while fear is recognized more 
accurately than other emotions (Pell and Kotz 2011).
Described in this way, emotional prosody is a particularly impor-
tant channel of information about the speaker’s mental state and is 
often a subtle but permanent aspect of what we register when listening 
to linguistic utterances in a familiar language (and as the above stud-
ies suggest, when we listen to foreign languages too). When your friend 
invites you to take another swim, a particular shade of happiness that I 
have labelled as ‘enthusiasm’ reveals how she feels about the prospects 
of going for a swim with you and colours her invitation in a subtle but 
important way. You are sensitive to that colouring, and recognize the 
emotional expression in her voice.
Prosodic cues of various types tend to create impressions and con-
vey information about speakers’ emotions or attitudes, rather than ex-
pressing full propositions or concepts in their own right, as words and 
utterances usually do (Wharton 2009: 141). But there is no doubt that 
prosody can and often does aid linguistic communication (Hirschberg 
2002; Fodor 2002; Wharton 2009). Prosodic contributions to linguistic 
communication are something that hearers regularly and systemati-
cally draw on in linguistic interactions. For example, the specifi c emo-
tional prosody that accompanies your friend’s invitation may infl uence 
what in the end you will take her to be communicating:
(swim 1) Would you like to take another swim? (happy, enthusiastic 
     tone of voice)
(swim 2) Would you like to take another swim? (neutral tone of voice)
When uttered in a happy, enthusiastic tone of voice (swim 1), the invi-
tation, given certain contextual expectations that you have about your 
friend and her interest in swimming, will likely be reinforced by the 
accompanying emotional prosody. When uttered in a neutral tone of 
voice (swim 2), the invitation to swim may, given some contextual as-
sumptions, indicate that your friend is not, after all, excited about the 
prospects of your taking another swim. Perhaps she is offering it out 
of politeness, knowing that you love to swim but are afraid of doing 
it alone, etc. Registering the emotional prosody in your friend’s voice 
will guide your overall interpretation of what happens in this linguistic 
interaction.
Another common example of how prosody impacts linguistic com-
munication is that of intentionally employing a specifi c type of stress 
pattern:
(swim 3) Would you like to take another swim?
(swim 4) Would you like to take another swim?
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When uttered with a neutral stress pattern, where the nuclear pitch 
accent falls at the end of the utterance, and specifi cally, on the last 
word (swim 3), given certain contextual expectations, you have grounds 
for taking your friend’s invitation at face value. When uttered with a 
contrastive stress pattern, with an accent on ‘you’ and ‘another’ (swim 
4), your friend’s utterance may strike you as indicating something dif-
ferent from an invitation to take another swim. With this contrastive 
stress pattern, your friend may be indicating that she would be sur-
prised if you accepted the invitation or that she doubts your stamina. 
Whichever interpretation might be most likely in this context, there 
is a clear sense in which prosodic variation in the stress pattern that 
accompanies an utterance contributes to what you will ultimately get 
from this linguistic interaction. It will affect how you interpret the in-
vitation and probably also how you respond to it.17
In typical linguistic interactions, when we listen to a familiar lan-
guage, we might have an experience of understanding what the speak-
er communicated with an utterance. But as the above evidence and ex-
amples show, we also routinely register the prosody that accompanies 
and partly constitutes linguistic utterances. We draw on information 
conveyed by vocal cues that are produced by the speaker both in a spon-
taneous and an intentional manner. Speakers have the resources to 
produce prosodic phenomena and do so regularly. Hearers register and 
draw on prosodic phenomena thanks to specifi c psychological mecha-
nisms.
The above observations have led many linguists to ask whether 
prosody, given its contribution to linguistic interactions, may encode 
some relatively stable meanings, and if so what kind of meanings those 
could be. As already mentioned, any claims about prosodic meanings 
or prosodic code are bound to be limited by the overwhelming context-
dependence of the contributions that prosodic information makes 
(Hirschberg 2002; Wharton 2009). According to Gussenhoven and col-
leagues (Gussenhoven 2002; Chen and Gussenhoven 2003), our under-
standing of various prosodic gestures is governed by both biological and 
properly linguistic codes. What they call the effort code is a biological 
code that connects the amount of energy that speakers utilize in speech 
production with specifi c prosodic cues to a range of interpretive effects. 
“An increase in effort may lead to increased articulatory precision, cre-
ating an impression of ‘helpfulness’, or ‘obligingness’; or it may result 
in a wider pitch range, creating an impression of ‘forcefulness’ or ‘cer-
tainty’ or conveying affective meanings such as ‘agitation’ or ‘surprise’” 
(in Wharton 2009: 143). A different approach to explaining the com-
municative contributions of prosodic gestures can be found in Wharton 
(2009). In his view, both spontaneous, uncontrolled and intentionally 
produced, properly linguistic prosodic gestures might encode proce-
dural information, i.e. information where a word (or other linguistic 
17 For other interesting examples see Wilson and Wharton 2006.
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device) encodes information specifi cally geared to guiding the hearer 
during the inferential phase of comprehension (145). In this sense, he 
argues, many prosodic gestures can be seen as encoding procedural 
meaning (Blakemore 2002; Escandell et al. 2011). 
For the purposes of this paper, I will not take a stance in the debate 
about whether and how we could model the meaningful contributions 
that prosody makes to linguistic communication. It suffi ces to say that 
prosody is an important element of spoken utterances that infl uences 
many linguistic interactions. Prosody is thus a plausible candidate to 
consider when investigating what we systematically experience when 
listening to a familiar language. Whether and which aspects of prosodic 
information could actually surface to hearers’ consciousness should be 
carefully investigated with both philosophical and empirical tools. In 
recent years prosody has received a lot of attention in theoretical lin-
guistics and in experimental psycholinguistics. Much work remains to 
be done, and new research avenues emerged, such as the use of prosody 
in artifi cial text-to-speech and speech-understanding systems (Hirsch-
berg 2002). Yet, curiously, prosody is rarely noticed in mainstream phil-
osophical discussions of linguistic communication and understanding. 
This is surprising, given the abundance of evidence for the claim that 
prosody is commonly produced by speakers, and routinely registered 
by hearers. Thus, a full answer to the question of what we experience 
when listening to a familiar language requires an empirically-informed 
account of the role of prosodic cues.
One might ask whether, in light of the evidence above, a distinction 
between possible contributions of linguistic understanding and prosody 
to what we experience would be in fact warranted. Prosodic cues can 
affect utterance understanding. The contrastive stress pattern can in-
fl uence even the truth-conditions of an utterance (as in “Sue only spoke 
to Laura, vs Sue only spoke to Laura”), thereby affecting what meaning 
or proposition we grasp upon hearing it.18 Neither allowing for prosodic 
contributions to utterance interpretation, nor for interactions between 
communicated meanings and prosody, would I think undermine the 
idea that we might be able to experience prosody as something differ-
ent from understanding an utterance. In many cases it makes sense 
to distinguish between understanding an utterance and hearing the 
accompanying prosody.
First, in many cases there is an intuitive sense in which we seem 
to register understanding an utterance and its vocal prosodic material 
separately. This is why we can capture our understanding by para-
phrasing the sentence uttered, as well as capture the prosodic char-
acteristics of the utterance by, for example, noting the emotions con-
veyed by a speaker’s voice or the stress pattern used. Second, we have 
psycholinguistic evidence that the processing of verbal speech material 
and prosodic speech material is performed by two largely independent 
18 I thank Deirdre Wilson for helpful comments regarding this issue.
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systems (e.g. Pell 2006; Belin et al. 2004). Third, verbal and prosodic 
contributions can come apart: a neutral tone of voice may not aid inter-
pretation at all, and emotional prosody may be detected even when the 
phonological sounds and word meanings are not, as in the case of hear-
ing emotions in an utterance produced in a foreign language or, as some 
studies suggest, in an artifi cial meaningless speech signal (Grandjean 
et al. 2005). Although linguistic understanding and prosody may and 
often do come together in linguistic communication, their possible con-
tributions to what we experience when listening to a familiar language 
can be considered (at least to some degree) separately.
4. Registering stable vocal characteristics of a speaker
In this section, I argue that in typical cases of listening to utterances 
produced in a familiar language, we also typically detect stable vocal 
characteristics of a speaker and that those are another candidate to 
consider for what could systematically experience when listening to a 
familiar language. Usually, such vocal characteristics are not used for 
the purpose of and do not aid linguistic communication, but neverthe-
less reveal a lot of interesting and important information about the 
speaker. There are certain vocal characteristics of a speaker’s voice 
that she or he cannot easily conceal when producing linguistic utter-
ances. Hearers are sensitive to those characteristics and register them 
when listening to speech from a particular speaker. Many vocal param-
eters that are exhibited in vocal production coming from a particular 
voice systematically correspond to and indicate important properties 
of a speaker. Voice conveys not only rich information about a speak-
er’s emotional state and attitudes (Pell and Kotz 2011; Bänzigier et al. 
2014), as explained in section 3, but also provides extra-linguistic cues 
that refl ect more stable speaker properties, including: identity (Bau-
mann and Belin 2010), biological sex (Owren et al. 2007), age (Mulac 
and Giles 1996), and even the socioeconomic status and regional back-
ground of a speaker (e.g. Rakić 2019).
How is it possible that our voices can reveal so much about us? Vocal 
sounds are generated by the interaction of a source (the vocal folds in 
the larynx) and a fi lter, i.e. the vocal tract above the larynx (Ghazanfar 
and Rendall 2008). Voiced sounds correspond to a periodic oscillation of 
the vocal folds with a well-defi ned fundamental frequency (f0). Although 
for an individual speaker the range of f0 values can vary quite a lot dur-
ing normal phonation or singing, the average f0 of a particular speaker 
is to a large extent a function of the size of the vocal folds (Latinus and 
Belin 2011). Male vocal folds tend to be longer and thicker than female 
vocal folds, causing them to vibrate at approximately half the frequency 
(100–120 Hz) than average female vocal folds (200–240 Hz) (Stevens 
1998). This is why female and male voices tend to differ systematically 
in a way that is often recognized by hearers. Human voices tend to vary 
extensively. Small differences in the dimensions and histology of the 
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individual body parts that speakers use in phonation result in great in-
dividual variability among speakers in the individual acoustic patterns 
they can produce. Interindividual differences in the dimensions of the 
vocal folds and their tension during speech production cause variation 
in mean fundamental frequency (f0) and voice quality. Differences in 
other parts of the vocal tract, such as the nasal passage, result in differ-
ences in the absolute and relative positions of the resonance frequencies 
of the vocal tract (for details see Schweinberger et al. 2014).
Given such a multitude of factors determining how our voices sound, 
it is important to understand which of the perceptible vocal character-
istics are utilized by hearers to identify speakers’ voices and differ-
entiate between them. Several studies suggest that perception of the 
fundamental frequency of a speaker’s voice is a key parameter in rec-
ognizing the voice (e.g., Bauman and Belin 2010). Other studies reveal 
a more complex picture, where other parameters such as jitter (local 
variations in period length), shimmer (local variation in period ampli-
tude) and harmonics-to-noise ratio are also utilized in voice perception 
(e.g., Kreiman and Sidtis 2011). It is generally agreed that the human 
perceptual ability to recognize voices is realized by a particular neuro-
cognitive system. Neuroimaging studies have identifi ed several brain 
areas in the temporal cortex, located in the middle parts of the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS) bilaterally, which show a particular sensitiv-
ity to voices, irrespective of whether they contain speech (Belin et al. 
2004; Binder et al. 2000). Moreover, there is evidence that information 
about the stable vocal characteristics of a speaker is processed largely 
independently of the prosodic vocal information described in section 3. 
Studies investigating the perception of affective prosody show a greater 
activation of the right temporal lobe and right inferior prefrontal cor-
tex (Mitchell et al. 2003) for prosodic information.19 Other studies (e.g. 
Belin and Zatorre 2003) seem to confi rm the role of anterior temporal 
lobe regions of the right hemisphere, particularly right anterior STS 
regions, in processing information about speakers’ voices related to 
their identity.20
For humans, voices are among the most prevalent and salient 
sounds in the auditory environment. Our ability to analyze the infor-
mation that is contained in voices is important for many social interac-
tions. Take our swimming example again. Even without seeing your 
friend approaching you at the seaside, when you hear her enthusiasti-
cally uttering the sentence with which she invites you to take another 
swim, you would normally immediately recognize the voice you hear 
as the one that belongs to your friend. When you hear her inviting you 
19 The perception of identity information in the voice has been examined in 
several neuroimaging studies suggesting that the anterior temporal lobes in both 
hemispheres are more active during speaker identifi cation than during emotion 
identifi cation (Imaizumi et al., 1997).
20 Passages on pages 381 and 382 up till this point draw on material from section 
2 of Drożdżowicz 2020.
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to take another swim, you register information about the specifi c vocal 
parameters of her voice, such as its fundamental frequency, tempo, and 
the resonance frequencies that are determined by the anatomy of your 
friend’s vocal folds and vocal tract. It is by registering these parameters 
that you can hear the voice that utters the invitation as belonging to a 
middle-aged female. Moreover, given your familiarity with your friend’s 
voice, upon hearing those vocal parameters, you immediately recognize 
the voice as hers. Hearing the same invitation to take a swim uttered in 
the same context but in a voice that does not belong to your friend will 
result in a markedly different auditory experience of the stable vocal 
characteristics. Needless to say, an invitation from a stranger will have 
a very different communicative effect. Our sensitivity to human voices 
is an amazing perceptual advantage that allows us to effortlessly and 
typically accurately track a source of spoken linguistic utterances and 
in this way facilitates interactions based on linguistic communication. 
As already mentioned, there are other properties of speakers that 
are systematically indicated by relatively stable vocal characteristics of 
a speaker’s voice. Among them, regional dialect and foreign accent are 
properties of speakers that we are sensitive to. At this point you may 
no longer pay attention to her accent, but the fi rst time you heard your 
friend speaking, it may have struck you that she speaks with a slight 
Danish accent. Having watched multiple Danish crime series, you were 
actually able to correctly identify her accent as Danish, though many of 
your friends initially struggled with that. In many cases, we recognize 
stable vocal characteristics of a speaker that point to an identifi able 
regional dialect or foreign accent. As we detect them, we can often be-
come aware of the speaker’s place of origin, ethnic background, and 
sometimes even their socioeconomic status. It is not only what we say, 
but also how we sound, that has a power to generate impressions be-
yond what we intend to convey and often beyond what we would like to 
reveal to interlocutors.
Hearers’ impressions of speaker properties based on their percep-
tion of stable vocal characteristics need not always facilitate linguistic 
communication or the social interactions that draw on it. Take foreign 
accent as an example. Foreign accent can infl uence social interactions 
based on linguistic communication. Leaving aside rare exceptions in 
which foreign accents are perceived positively (Gibson et al 2017), there 
is evidence suggesting that in various sociolinguistic contexts speakers 
with foreign accents are judged to be less intelligent, less trustworthy, 
less educated and less competent than native speakers (e.g. Dewaele 
and McCloskey 2015; Dragojevic et al. 2016; Fraser and Kelly 2012; 
Fuertes et al. 2012; Gluszek and Dovidio 2010; Livingston et al. 2017). 
Negative bias towards foreign-accepted speech is present from early 
childhood (Kinzler et al. 2007). At the age of 11, children tend to trust 
native-accented speakers more (Kinzler et al. 2011).
The foreign accent bias may have (at least) two origins. One is lin-
guistic: foreign accent may decrease ‘processing fl uency’ and lead to 
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lower intelligibility of the speaker (Deterding and Kirkpatrick 2006; 
Cristia et al. 2012).21 The other is social: foreign-accented speakers are 
rapidly categorised as out-group members. In this way, foreign accent 
may lead to negative evaluation of speaker’s competence by being a 
function of shared negative attitudes towards the ethnicity of the ac-
cented speaker (Lippi-Green 1997; Roessel et al. 2019). The foreign ac-
cent bias has been shown to lead to discrimination in various contexts, 
for example in the courtroom (Solan and Tiersma 2004) and in job in-
terviews (Huang 2013; Hansen and Dovidio 2016).
Although, your friend’s Danish accent may not be an issue when she 
is inviting you to take a swim, information about the speaker’s stable 
vocal characteristics can systematically infl uence social interactions. 
Registering stable vocal characteristics of a speaker and the resulting 
impressions may facilitate linguistic communication and social interac-
tions, but it may also systematically impede them. Such vocal charac-
teristics are another candidate to consider when investigating what we 
systematically experience in linguistic communication. Our sensitivity 
to stable vocal characteristics of a speaker raises interesting ethical 
questions about linguistic interactions that are affected by our impres-
sions of the speaker. It also invites us to consider whether and which 
properties of vocal production could be perceived by hearers and which 
might result from inference and the underlying implicit beliefs that 
hearers have about speakers. This is a complex question that requires 
detailed treatment. Where and how exactly the border between audito-
ry vocal perception and audition-based cognition of speaker properties 
is to be drawn is a diffi cult matter that is likely to generate an intense 
discussion and requires both philosophical and empirical investigation 
(e.g. Di Bona 2017).
5. Concluding remarks
I have argued that at least three elements need to be considered when 
we ask what we systematically experience when listening to a familiar 
language. (i) We perceive speech sounds and typically seem to have 
an experience of understanding what the speaker communicated with 
an utterance on a particular occasion. (ii) We register various forms of 
prosody and thanks to that we can learn about speaker’s attitudes and 
mental states indicated by prosodic cues. (iii) We register the speaker’s 
stable vocal characteristics and have systematic impressions about the 
speaker’s identity. Those three elements should be investigated when 
we consider the question of what could be systematically present in 
our experience when we listen to a familiar language, given that they: 
21 This might involve a pragmatic component: in some contexts foreign accents 
might increase processing effort for native speakers when fi rst encountered, and 
might therefore affect assessments of relevance, and ultimately competence etc. This 
effect could in some cases diminish as hearers become more familiar with the accent 
and it becomes easier to process. I thank Deirdre Wilson for these points.
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(a) result from common forms of linguistic expression and information 
transfer in humans, and (b) are registered by hearers thanks to the 
specifi c psychological mechanisms that are employed in spoken linguis-
tic communication and voice perception.
As already mentioned, the three elements need not always be pres-
ent when we listen to linguistic utterances. An utterance may not be 
understood, a speaker may produce an utterance in a fl at tone, or they 
may have a voice that makes it particularly diffi cult to identify any 
speaker properties. Typically, however, the three elements are rou-
tinely produced and registered in spoken linguistic communication. 
How strong is the claim about the systematic presence of these three 
elements? This type of systematicity is contingent on our biological 
and cultural evolution. It is not entirely impossible that there could 
exist forms of human linguistic communication that do not make use 
of prosody,22 and we can even imagine speakers who lack typical vo-
cal characteristics. Human speakers however, at least for now, com-
municate using their vocal apparatus that has evolved in a particular 
manner (Belin et al. 2004). Moreover, they tend to take advantage of 
prosodic forms of expression when producing linguistic utterances. Hu-
man hearers are sensitive to such stable vocal characteristics and pro-
sodic phenomena.
The paper provides some preliminary work for addressing the ques-
tion of what we systematically experience when listening to a familiar 
language. I believe that a more inclusive approach to address the ques-
tion is required if we are to make progress on epistemic and moral 
questions concerning testimony and other forms of social interactions 
that draw on linguistic communication in different contexts.
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